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WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT 
HAVE DECIDED THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION OF 2000 
Jesse H. Choper* 
Bush v. Gore,1 the Supreme Court's final decision and last 
exercise of its immense power of judicial review in the 20th cen-
tury, will be one of its most discussed rulings for many years to 
come (althou9h rarely cited-I predict-for its specific substan-
tive holding). The Justices' assumption of governmental au-
thority reached a new dimension on December 12, 2000, when 
by a 5-4 margin, the Court affirmed its decision of three days 
earlier to halt Florida's recount of votes for the presidential elec-
tion, effectively deciding the contest in favor of Republican can-
didate George W. Bush. In my view, the Court's intervention in 
the election was ill advised, not because of the merits of the 
Court's decision, which has been the dominant subject of both 
scholarly and journalistic commentary on the ruling, but rather 
because the proper role of judicial review in our system of gov-
ernment dictates the conclusion that the Court's adjudication 
was both unnecessary and unwise, creating a widely-based popu-
lar perception of partisanship by the Judicial Branch that carries 
the threat of diminishing the public's trust and confidence in the 
Justices and endangering the Court's institutional standing and 
overall effectiveness. 
I 
When should the Supreme Court exercise its extraordinary 
power of judicial review, which is seemingly the most anti-
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Berkeley (Boalt Hall). I wish to thank Pratik A. Shah, Boalt '01, for his excellent assis-
tance in preparation of this comment, and my colleagues, Phillip Frickey, Paul Mishkin, 
Robert Post, Michael Smith, and John Yoo, my friend Willis Slusser, Boalt '41, and Pro-
fessor Donald Dripps of the University of Minnesota Law School for helpful comments. 
1. 531 u.s. 98 (2000). 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 68-92. 
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majoritarian of all exercises of national authority, in direct con-
flict with our fundamental principles of majoritarian democ-
racy?3 I believe that the Justices should only intervene to secure 
those constitutional values, mainly found in those constitutional 
clauses that establish individual rights, that cannot be otherwise 
adequately protected in the political process. In contrast to dis-
putes concerning federalism (the allocation of power between 
the national government and the states)4 and the separation of 
powers between Congress and the President,5 where the contest-
ants are forcefully represented in the national political process, 
the interests of those such as racial, ethnic, and religious minori-
ties, political dissidents and persons accused of crime are particu-
larly susceptible to majoritarian indifference or abuse.6 By ordi-
narily limiting judicial review to this category of constitutional 
provisions, the Court reduces the discord between judicial re-
view and majoritarian democracy and enhances its ability to 
render enforceable constitutional decisions when its participa-
tion is critically needed.7 While the Court should not avoid mat-
ters based on their controversial nature (and many individual 
rights cases strongly fit this description), neither should it need-
lessly dissipate its limited institutional support or "capital." 
II 
Although, as will be discussed below, the issues addressed 
by the Justices in Bush v. Gore plainly presented two federal 
questions, judicial review was not required to secure individual 
constitutional rights and, more importantly, the central question 
in the case should have been resolved through the political 
rather than the judicial process. 
At its core, the case confronted the Court with questions of 
state electoral law-whether the Florida Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the state's election statutes "impermissibly dis-
torted" the statutory scheme "beyond what a fair reading re-
quired" so as to be judicial lawmaking, and thus contrary to Art. 
I, § 2 of the federal Constitution.8 The one notable exception to 
3. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process ch. 1 
(U. Chicago Press, 1980). 
4. ld. at ch. 4. 
5. Id. at ch. 5. 
6. ld. at ch. 2. 
7. ld. at ch. 3. 
8. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 48-53. 
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this non-individual rights type issue-and the basis on which 
seven members of the Court agreed to reverse the Florida Su-
preme Court-was the contention that the discretionary proce-
dures being used in the judicially ordered statewide recount of 
the undervote in Florida, between counties and within certain 
counties themselves, in order to determine the "clear intent" of 
the voter, violated the fundamental right to vote on an equal ba-
sis secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. While judicial review is ordinarily a necessary 
safeguard against equal protection violations by the political 
branches of government,9 the nature of the equal protection vio-
lation alleged in Bush v. Gore did not implicate the typical con-
cern for minority rights. The varying recount standards were 
neither intended, nor would appear in fact, to be skewed to pro-
duce a disparate impact in respect to the votes of any identifiable 
group, such as a racial minority or a political party. Rather, the 
choice of standard would seem to promise a random or unpre-
dictable (rather than systematic) effect on whose votes would be 
deemed valid.10 Given this indeterminate result, there is reason 
to be willing to defer to the local political entities that selected 
the recount methods,11 especially in light of the powerful consid-
erations against the Court's intervention, to be discussed be-
low.12 
9. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
10. Professor Dworkin makes a slightly different argument which leads to the same 
general conclusion: "The Florida court's 'clear intention' standard (taken from Florida 
statutory law) puts no one at a disadvantage even if it is interpreted differently in differ-
ent counties. Voters who indent a chad without punching it clean through run a risk that 
a vote they did not mean to make will be counted if they live in a county that uses a gen-
erous interpretation of the 'clear intent' statute; or they run a risk that a vote they meant 
to make will be discarded if they live in a county that uses a less generous interpretation. 
But since neither of these risks is worse than the other-both threaten a citizen's power 
to make his or her vote count-the abstract standard discriminates against no one, and 
no question of equal protection is raised." Ronald Dworkin, Reply to Fried Letter, 
XLVIII N.Y. Review of Books 9-10 (Feb. 22, 2001). Professor Chemerinsky reaches a 
similar conclusion through the argument that Governor Bush had no standing to raise 
the equal protection claim because "[t)here was no reason to believe that the counting 
procedure would treat ballots for Bush any differently from ballots for Gore." Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1093, 1097 
(2001). 
11. In contrast, the need for judicial review would be considerably stronger if the 
claim had been that vote-counting methods were systematically more inaccurate in coun-
ties with a higher proportion of members of one of the major political parties rather than 
the other, or of minority or poor voters. See Dworkin, Reply to Fried Letter at 10 n.3 
(cited in note 10). 
12. Cf. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 5 (1972) (per curiam) (staying lower court 
judgment of equal protection violation because of the availability of alternative forum for 
resolution "and the large public interest in allowing the political processes to function 
free from judicial supervision"). 
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Further, from an operational standpoint, the process that 
was in place for determining the unresolved presidential election 
was working adequately-at least to the extent that litigation is 
an acceptable method of dispute resolution. Although a whirl-
wind sequence of legal activity followed the election and auto-
matic recount,13 Vice President Gore exercised his challenges 
pursuant to Florida election law in the Florida courts.14 More-
over, nothing prevented those courts from considering Governor 
Bush's counter arguments based on federal law.15 While the 
presidential candidates battled in the courts, the nation, though 
anxious-or, at least, impatient-to have a final result, remained 
stable. Despite some media forecasts and observations by vari-
ous commentators of a "constitutional crisis, "16 no tangible indi-
cations of this seemed to appear. President Clinton still occu-
pied the White House with undiminished authority to conduct 
the affairs of the nation, even to respond to such tragic emergen-
cies as occurred on December 7 or September 11. Plainly, there 
was neither the threat nor the reality of any social unrest, vio-
lence, or formal military intervention.17 The economy remained 
13. For a detailed summary of the events leading to the Court's grant of certiorari 
in Bush v. Gore, see Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73-75 
(2000) and Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100-03 (2000) ("[After the automatic recount,] 
Vice President Gore ... sought manual recounts in Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and 
Miami-Dade Counties, pursuant to Florida's election protest provisions. A dispute arose 
concerning the deadline for local county canvassing boards to submit their returns to the 
Secretary of State (Secretary). The Secretary declined to waive the November 14 dead-
line imposed by statute. The Florida Supreme Court, however, set the deadline at No-
vember 26. We granted certiorari and vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision, 
finding considerable uncertainty as to the grounds on which it was based. On December 
11, the Florida Supreme Court issued a decision on remand reinstating that date. On 
November 26, the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission certified the results of the 
election and declared Governor Bush the winner of Florida's 25 electoral votes. On No-
vember 27, Vice President Gore, pursuant to Florida's contest provisions, filed a com-
plaint in Leon County Circuit Court contesting the certification. . . . The Circuit Court 
denied relief.... [Gore] appealed.... Accepting jurisdiction, the Florida Supreme 
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.") (citations omitted). 
14. See Fla. Stat § 102.168 (2000). Governor Bush filed a federal court action. 
Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1054 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (brought by George W. 
Bush, Richard Cheney, and voters of 4 Florida counties) ("A Federal Court has a very 
limited role and should not interfere except where there is an immediate need to correct 
a constitutional violation."), affd by 234 F.3d 1163, 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) (en bane). See 
also Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2000) (brought by voters of Bre-
vard County, Florida and decided along with Siegel v. LePore). 
15. In fact, the dissenting opinions in the Florida Supreme Court discussed both the 
Article II and equal protection concerns. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1268, 1272 (Fla. 
2000) (Wells, C.J., Harding, J., dissenting). 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 69-80. 
17. See Gore's Time Ran Out: Democracy Wins, Chicago Sun-Times 53 (Dec. 13, 
2000) ("[T]here were no soldiers taking over the streets, no general or colonel assuming 
control of the country."). 
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stable.18 There was not even any serious name-calling by the 
competing camps, at least not beyond the usual election season 
fare. Rather, the contestants proceeded in the American way-
they sued! And the American public was afforded an unusual 
opportunity to observe the path of the rule of law in action.19 
The real difficulty was not the dispute resolution process. 
Rather, the problem was the unusual circumstance that there 
was no practically ascertainable winner of the presidential elec-
tion of 2000, which essentially ended in a tie. If, as Professor 
Charles Fried explains, there was no way to design a statistically 
valid recount because "a difference of 0.5 percent in an election 
in which a hundred million votes were cast-at various times, 
under diverse circumstances, by a wide variety of means-
exceeds our present capacity for accurate tabulation,"20 then that 
18. During the period following the election until Bush v. Gore was decided, the 
stock market fell, which some analysts attributed to the uncertainty regarding the elec-
tion outcome. See, e.g., E.S. Browning, Uncertainty on Election Hurts Stocks, Wall St. J. 
C1 (Nov. 29, 2000); E. S. Browning, Vote-Count Saga Spurs Stock Fall, Wall St. J. C1 
(Nov. 10, 2000). However, it is difficult to trace the harm to the disputed election, and 
other analysts reject this explanation as a major cause of the downturn. See, e.g., Greg-
ory Zuckerman, Market Woes May Outlast Election, Wall St. J. C1 (Nov. 13, 2000). In 
fact, the market began falling before the election and continued to fall for some time 
thereafter. See, e.g., Jonathan Fuerbringer, New Bush Status Does Little to Fuel Sus-
tained Rally, N.Y. Times ClO (Dec. 14, 2000). 
19. As Professor Elizabeth Garrett persuasively characterizes the situation: 
Unlike other instances in our history where the presidential election ended in a 
dispute, no armed forces were gathering. Nor was the country at a critical his-
torical juncture, as it was in 1876, when it faced rebuilding part of the country in 
the wake of a civil war. Instead, we watched as local and state officials tried to 
apply a rather confusing statutory structure to unanticipated events. We 
learned about the relationship of elected administrative officers like the secre-
tary of state to the state courts and to the state legislature. We saw the interac-
tion in a federal system of state and national entities. We listened as appellate 
justices at the state and national levels asked probing and difficult questions. 
To the extent that people were paying attention-and a good number of us 
were-we were also learning about how a stable democracy deals with prob-
lems that arise in elections. 
Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in Cass Sunstein and Richard Ep-
stein, eds., The Vote: Bush, Gore and the Supreme Court 50 (U. Chicago Press, 2001). 
20. Charles Fried, Letter to the Editor ('A Badly Flawed Election': An Exchange), 
XLVIII N.Y. Review of Books 8-9 (Feb. 22, 2001). Professor Fried's assessment seems 
to be confirmed by the conflicting reports of several early independent recounts in Flor-
ida. See, e.g., Stephanie Desmon, Florida Recounts Fall Short of Unanimous: Results and 
Methods Clash During Reviews of Presidential Votes, Baltimore Sun 1A (Mar. 24, 2001); 
Michael Kranish, Fla. Media Recounts Offer Mixed Results, Boston Globe A1 (Mar. 19, 
2001). For a subsequent venture, see Dennis Cauchon and Jim Drinkard, Special Report: 
Florida Voter Errors Cost Gore the Election, USA Today 1A (May 11, 2001) (reporting 
the results of a study of 111,261 uncounted overvotes by USA Today, The Miami Herald, 
and five other Florida newspapers that the hypothetical winner would have depended on 
which review standard was used, with Bush winning under the strict standards and Gore 
under the lenient standards); AP, All-Florida Recount: Still No Clear Winner; More De-
mocratic Ballots Had Errors, Seattle Times Al (May 11, 2001) (same). See also infra 
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was multitudinously true in Florida where no count or recount 
ever reached a difference as large as a thousand votes out of six 
million cast (.0167% ).21 It may well be that the fairest solution 
(clearly the quickest and least costly) would have been to flip a 
coin.22 Such means, however, strike many citizens as unaccept-
able because of our national sense of propriety and admirable 
belief in the search for "truth," both of which might affect the 
coin-toss winner's mantle of legitimacy to govern. 
Finally, from the perspective of both public policy and con-
stitutional doctrine, Bush v. Gore presented a "political" ques-
tion.23 On its face, the ultimate issue in Bush v. Gore-who shall 
be elected president of the United States-is the most "political" 
of all matters in our nation. As a matter of policy, our govern-
mental system erects a formidable presumption that political is-
sues should be resolved by political means, so as not to embroil 
the Court in partisan political maneuverings beyond its institu-
tional capacity and role?4 
note 33. 
21. See Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock ch. 2 (Princeton U. Press, 2001). 
22. In fact, several state statutes expressly provide for a coin flip to determine elec-
tion ties. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 46:1410(C)(3) (West, 2000) ("In case of a tie, the 
secretary of state shall invite the candidates to his office and shall determine the winner 
by the flip of a coin."); Mo. Rev. Stat. 162.492 (2000) (1978 Amendment deleted former 
subsec. 6, which provided that a tie vote would be determined by the flip of a coin); N.D. 
Cent. Code §§ 16.1-11-38, 16.1-14-0, 16.1-15-29, 40-21-17, 58-04-15 (2000) ("In case of a 
tie vote the nominee or nominees must be determined by a coin flip .... "). See also 
Huber v. Reznick, 437 N.E.2d 828, 839 (Ill. App. 1982) (holding that trial court did not 
err in choosing a coin flip as the method of determining the winner of the tie vote by lot); 
N. M.Stat. Ann. § 1-13-11 (2000) ("candidate chosen by lot ... in the event of a tie 
vote"); Reuters, Election 2000; The Presidency; High Stakes; If Vote is Tied in New Mex-
ico, Poker Hand Could Settle It, Newsday A05 (Nov. 15, 2000) (describing practice of 
using "one hand of five-card poker"). 
23. Here, I use the term "political question" both as a "term of art" and more 
loosely (as commonly understood), referring to it both as a constitutional constraint as 
well as a prudential tool to limit the Court's jurisdiction. In the less formal sense, the 
Court could have avoided deciding the question embodied in Bush v. Gore in several 
ways short of expressly finding it nonjusticiable under Article III: denial of certiorari in 
the first case, denial of certiorari in the second case, or denial of the stay. 
24. See infra Part III (discussing the perception of partisanship that tainted the 
Court by reviewing Bush v. Gore); Michael C. Dorf, Supreme Court Pulled a Bait and 
Switch, L.A. Times Bll (Dec. 14, 2000) (criticizing the Court for overreaching in "decid-
ing issues that are perhaps best left to the political process," and commenting that the 
"wisest course for the court may have been to stay out of the presidential contest en-
tirely"). Along related lines, Professor Alexander Bickel argued for judicial restraint in 
resolving political disputes, especially in cases marked by, among other things, the 
"strangeness of the issue," its "intractability to principled resolution," its "sheer momen-
tousness ... which tends to unbalance judicial judgment," and "the inner vulnerability, 
the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw 
strength from." Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 184 (Bobbs-Merrill, 
1962); cf. Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon 
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The issue in Bush v. Gore also qualifies as a "political ques-
tion" under a more formal doctrinal analysis by which, pursuant 
to separation of powers principles, the Court defers to the politi-
cal branches for final determination of certain constitutional is-
sues.25 The first, and seemingly most important,26 of the four cri-
teria that the Court considers in determining the existence of a 
political question-whether there is a "textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department"27 -strongly suggests that the core issue in Bush v. 
Gore was nonjusticiable. The Twelfth Amendment (which sup-
plants provisions of Art. II, § 1 dealing with the Electoral Col-
lege) expressly remits to the House of Representatives (plainly 
that organ of the national government originally intended to be 
most responsive to the will of the people )28 the authority to 
choose the President if no candidate receives a majority of the 
electoral votes.29 Furthermore, the Electoral Count Act, a set of 
federal statutes enacted after the Hayes-Tilden election30 to im-
Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 30 (1974) (criticizing the Su-
preme Court for prematurely cutting off the political process of impeachment in the 
House of Representatives, a more appropriate forum). See also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Mr. 
Justice Taylor Presiding, Legal Times 73-75 (Dec. 4, 2000) (arguing that Bush v. Gore 
presented a political question because "[i)f, in the end, people on the losing side believe 
that Congress or the Florida Legislature has flouted the will of the people, their remedy 
must lie at the polls, not in any courtroom"). 
25. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962). 
26. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230-31 (focusing the analysis on the commitment of the 
impeachment power to the Senate through both the text of Constitution ("sole" power) 
and the Framers' intent). 
27. See cases cited supra note 25. There is also a strong argument that the judg-
ment that effectively determines who shall be president is "of a kind clearly for nonjudi-
cial discretion," that such judgment implied "lack of respect due coordinate branches of 
government," and that it carries the "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
28. Constitutional Convention delegate Thomas Johnson expressed the direct rep-
resentative role conceived for the House of Representatives in contrast to that for the 
Senate: "[I)n some respects the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and 
in others as districts of individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, in-
stead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in one branch [the 
House] the people, ought to be represented; in the other [the Senate) the States." Tho-
mas A. Bailey, The American Pageant 140-41 (Heath, 3d ed. 1966); see also Page Smith, 
The Constitution-A Documentary and Narrative History 175 (William Morrow and Co., 
1978). The Framers' decision to provide for popular election of House members in con-
trast to state legislature elections of Senate members and electoral college election of the 
President irrebuttably demonstrates the House's more populist origins. See U.S. Canst., 
Art. I,§§ 2-3; Art. II, §1. 
29. U.S. Canst., Amend. XII. 
30. In passing the Electoral Count Act in 1887, which expanded previous legislation 
enacted in 1845, Congress was acutely aware of the dangers of Supreme Court Justices 
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plement Congress's task under the Twelfth Amendment to count 
the electoral vote, assigns to Congress the authority and respon-
sibility to settle disputes remaining after a state has tried to re-
solve electoral contests through "judicial" (which Florida ex-
pressly chose to do)31 or other means. Notably, neither the 
Constitution nor the federal statutes mention any role for the 
Supreme Court in this "adjudicative" process?2 
deciding election outcomes after the Hayes-Tilden presidential election of 1876. In that 
election, three states each sent two slates of electors, whose votes would decide the elec-
tion. Congress appointed an electoral commission composed of five Senators, five Rep-
resentatives, and five Supreme Court Justices. The Commission divided along partisan 
lines, and the deciding vote fell to Justice Bradley, who immediately became the object of 
charges of partiality. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 153-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For 
the criticism leveled at the performance of all the Justices, see C. Vann Woodward, Re-
union and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction 165-74 (Lit-
tle, Brown & Co., 1956). Professor Bickel concluded that while Bradley acted honestly 
and followed legal principles, "in the circumstances the issue of principle was trivial, it 
was overwhelmed by all that hung in the balance, and it should not have been decisive." 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 185 (cited in note 24). 
31. See Fla. Stat. § 102.168 (2000). Because the Electoral Count Act anticipates 
involvement of a state's courts in resolving controversies regarding the appointment of 
that state's electors, and because any decision of the Florida Supreme Court would ulti-
mately be "appealed" to Congress, see infra notes 35-36, the Florida courts' involvement 
does not implicate the political question doctrine, which concerns only the federal judici-
ary. 
32. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 15 (2000). Moreover, the legislative history of the Act unquali-
fiedly affirms an intent to commit the power to resolve electoral disputes to Congress 
rather than the Court: 
The two Houses are, by the Constitution, authorized to make the count of elec-
toral votes. They can only count legal votes, and in doing so must determine, 
from the best evidence to be had, what are legal votes . . . . The power to de-
termine rests with the two Houses, and there is no other constitutional tribunal. 
H.R. No. 1638, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1886) (Rep. Caldwell) (quoted in Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). The sponsoring congressman explained: 
The interests of all the States in their relations to each other in the Federal Un-
ion demand that the ultimate tribunal to decide upon the election of the Presi-
dent should be a constituent body, in which the States in their federal relation-
ships and the people in their sovereign capacity should be represented. 
18 Cong. Rec. 30 (1886) (quoted in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
And Senator Sherman, the sponsor in the Senate, cautioned against the Supreme Court's 
involvement: "It would be a very grave fault indeed and a very serious objection to refer 
a political question in which the people of the country were aroused, about which their 
feelings were excited, to this great tribunal . . . . It would tend to bring that court into 
public odium of one or the other of the two great parties." 17 Cong. Rec. 817-18 (1886) 
(Sen. Sherman). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court: The Fall of 
the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 
237 (2002) (stating that both the original understanding and subsequent history confirm 
that authority to resolve elector disputes was vested in the state legislatures, with review 
by Congress, and no role for the Supreme Court). 
For the view that "it is at the least not obvious that the Constitution contains a de-
monstrable textual commitment of the Article II question to Congress," see Mark 
Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disap-
pearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. Rev. (2001). 
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While the Electoral Count Act is not free of certain ambi-
guities and possible constitutional problems, it is relevant to con-
sider what would have likely happened if the Court had ab-
stained. Presumably, the recount would have continued. Under 
the simplest scenario, if the Florida process would have shown 
Governor Bush to be the winner, the election saga would have 
ended.33 Had the recount shown Vice President Gore to be the 
winner, the story becomes more complicated. First, based on 
one of the federal statutory provisions,34 the Republican-
controlled Florida legislature was poised to follow through with 
its plan to send a slate of Bush electors to Washington which 
would have competed with the Gore electors designated by the 
successful recount.35 Faced with opposing sets of electors when 
it met on January 6, 2001, the two newly-elected Houses of Con-
gress, as specified by the Electoral Count Act, would "concur-
rently decide [which votes] were cast by lawful electors ap-
pointed in accordance with the laws of [Florida]."36 Assuming 
congressional voting along party lines, the Republican-
controlled House of Representatives would have selected Gov-
ernor Bush. Given the 50-50 Democrat-Republican composition 
of the Senate, a tie would have resulted, in which case the Vice-
President-still Gore-would have cast the decisive ballot. 
Thus, the House and Senate would likely have split. The federal 
33. Most reports from independent recounts have shown that Governor Bush 
would in fact have won. See, e.g., Audrey Hudson, Bush Is Victor Again in Latest Florida 
Tally, Washington Times A9 (Mar. 23, 2001) (reporting that an accounting firm audit of 
undervotes in six counties commissioned by Judicial Watch revealed that Bush would still 
have won; in fact, Bush gained 107-116 votes); Gore Missed Few Votes, Recount Review 
Finds, Wall St. J. A4 (Feb. 27, 2001) (reporting that Miami Herald's review found that 
Gore would have netted gain of no more than 49 votes had Miami-Dade County com-
pleted manual recount of 10,644 undervotes). Compare Extra! Gore Wins Florida! 
Hello?, The Nation 8 (April2, 2001) (reporting that Palm Beach Post's recount of under-
votes gave Gore 784 additional votes in Palm Beach County, and the butterfly ballots 
cost Gore an estimated 6,600 votes there). 
34. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (2000): "Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose 
of choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the 
electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of 
such State may direct." 
35. See Linda Kleindienst, Legislators Dodge Dispute On Vote Senate Delayed 
Elector Decision, South Florida Sun-Sentinel19A (Dec. 17, 2000) (discussing the Florida 
legislature, which had called a special session to elect its own set of presidential electors, 
and its plans to appoint Bush electors despite the state supreme court's contrary deci-
sions). For discussion of how such electors might be subject to constitutional challenge, 
see Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 Yale 
L.J. 1407, 1423 n.60 (2001). Alternatively, even if the legislature had failed to act, those 
designated by the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission's earlier Nov. 26 certifica-
tion, duly signed by Florida's governor, might have claimed to be the legitimate electors, 
thus similarly presenting Congress with competing slates. 
36. 3 u.s.c. §15 (2000). 
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statute speaks to this outcome as well: "[I]f the two Houses shall 
disagree in respect of the counting of such votes, then, and in 
that case, the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have 
been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal 
thereof, shall be counted. "37 Hence, the decision seemingly 
would have rested in the hands of the governor of Florida, Re-
publican Jeb Bush, George W. Bush's brother,38 who would have 
undoubtedly selected the Republican nominee, thus ending the 
presidential election. 
Several ancillary points are worth noting in this connection. 
First, the second scenario's assumption that members of Con-
gress would vote along party lines is not a foregone conclusion. 
If the completed recount were generally viewed to be fair, some 
House Republicans might have voted for Vice President Gore to 
preserve the intent of the voters of Florida. (However, given 
that seven members of the Supreme Court found fatal equal pro-
tection flaws with the method of the recount, Republicans would 
have had little trouble faulting it.) Second, during the Senate 
vote, debate might have surrounded Vice President Gore's cast-
ing the deciding ballot in his own favor as a conflict of interest. 
But given that the decision would then have proceeded to Flor-
ida's governor, Jeb Bush, the real conflict of interest controversy 
would have likely erupted then (if at all). Still, that family con-
flict, while perhaps adding to the drama, should not be determi-
native. The relevant fact is Jeb Bush's status as a Republican. 
The federal statute clearly granted decisionmaking authority to 
the state executive-a politically partisan individual-who would 
virtually always have some party affiliation. Since Florida's gov-
ernor is a Republican, it should be obvious that he would select 
the Republican presidential candidate, absent some compelling 
contrary circumstances. Alternatively, Jeb Bush could have 
avoided any familial conflict and recused himself in favor of the 
Lieutenant Governor, Frank Brogan, who is also a Republican. 
37. Id. 
38. Based on 3 U.S.C. §15's "shall have been certified" language, some ambiguity 
exists as to whether it provides for prospective or only retrospective deference to the 
state governor's decision. If it were interpreted to permit Congress to only look retro-
spectively at which slate of electors that the state executive had certified, Jeb Bush, not 
the Florida legislature, would have had to certify the Bush electors for Bush to win. The 
Florida Supreme Court, however, might have ordered the Florida Governor to certify the 
Gore electors after the recount, presumably superceding the Secretary of State's Nov. 26 
certification. Nevertheless, it is unlikely Jeb Bush would have complied, especially had 
Republicans favored the retrospective interpretation. 
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In all, there is good reason to believe that the designated 
statutory framework would have fulfilled its drafters' intention 
of avoiding the pitfalls of the Hayes-Tilden aftermath?9 While a 
number of people, who foresaw some form of "constitutional cri-
sis"40 that demanded the intervention of the Supreme Court, 
were distressed by the prospect of partisan controversy if the 
election of the President were to be determined by the political 
agencies provided in the Electoral Count Act, as pointed out by 
Professor Samuel Issacharoff, "it was, after all, a partisan elec-
tion that was at stake. It hardly seems an affront to democratic 
self-governance to channel the ultimate resolution of a true elec-
toral deadlock into other democratically-elected branches of 
government. "41 
III 
In joining the election fray, the Supreme Court's ruling pro-
duced the most disappointing-and potentially destructive-
outcome: a 5-4 division, creating the reasonable perception of 
partisanship42 (regardless of its existence in fact), halting the re-
count and making George W. Bush the President. The basis on 
which most of the general public understood the decision- that 
the five members of the Court who quite regularly make up its 
conservative majority (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices 
Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas) voted to end the re-
count, while the four usual members of its liberal wing (Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer) wished to continue the 
39. See supra note 32. Indeed, even if the congressional process had failed to re-
solve the matter by inauguration day, the Presidential Succession Act, 3 U.S.C. § 17, sets 
forth a remedy. 
40. See infra text accompanying notes 69-80. 
41. Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in Sunstein and Epstein, eds, The Vote: 
Bush, Gore and the Supreme Court at 73 (cited in note 19). Professor Issacharoff echoed 
the sentiment expressed by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg: 
"However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult electoral dis-
putes, Congress, being a political body, expresses the people's will far more accurately 
than does an unelected Court. And the people's will is what elections are about." Bush 
v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
42. For example, Evan Schultz of Legal Times, while deliberately avoiding the 
question of whether the justices were actually partisan, nevertheless concluded that the 
"Supreme Court, always accused of being political, now has to face the fact that it looks 
downright partisan." Evan P. Schultz, Justice Unrobed, Legal Times 70 (Dec. 18, 2000) 
(emphasis added). Even supporters of Governor Bush, who maintained that the Court 
did not act out merely out of politics, said "the perception of rank politics was inaccurate 
but at the same understandable." Linda Greenhouse, Divining the Consequences of a 
Court Divided, N.Y. Times§ 4 (Dec. 17, 2000) (citing Professor Richard J. Pierce) (em-
phasis added). 
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process in some form43 -makes it easy to understand why allega-
tions of political bias erupted.44 These were especially fueled by 
the President's power to designate new Justices and the persis-
tent reports that several conservative incumbents desired to re-
tire.45 Indeed, the notion that the Justices might become instru-
43. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111-12,135-36, 144-45,158. 
44. The quick and hostile reaction, outside legal academia and court watchers, is 
evidenced through various individual letters published by The Washington Post just days 
after the decision: "[T]he Rehnquist Court shattered the status quo of our belief in a Su-
preme Court that can rise above politics. It has dragged itself and the nation through a 
demoralizing display of partisanship." (Keith Ellis, Arlington); "A query for our es-
teemed Supreme Court justices: If the political victor in the historic recount case had 
been unknown to them, would their votes have been the same?" (Diane Heiman, Be-
thesda); "So much for the rule of Jaw. The intellectual dishonesty of the Supreme Court 
decision fails to mask a raw partisan abuse of the unique powers granted by the Constitu-
tion. All that remains is to change the name of the institution from 'Supreme Court' to 
'Final Political Instrument."' (Charles Blankstein, Falls Church). A Tuesday to Remem-
ber, Wash. Post A34 (Dec. 14, 2000). 
For early critical response from academia, see Ledyard King, Regular People, 
Weighty Decision Put High Court in New Light, Gannett News Service (Dec. 14, 2000) 
(quoting Professor Michael Gerhardt stating "the court has transformed itself into a po-
litical institution"); Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, New Republic 18 (Dec. 25, 2000) (the Court 
has "made it impossible for citizens of the United States to sustain any kind of faith in 
the rule of Jaw as something larger than the self-interested political preferences of [the 
conservative majority]"). Professor Akhil Amar was quoted as saying that "[m]any of us 
thought that courts do not act in an openly political fashion. So this decision comes as a 
startling event that has shaken constitutional faith," David G. Savage and Henry 
Weinstein, Supreme Court Ruling: Right or Wrong, L.A. Times A24, A25 (Dec. 21, 2000), 
and that "[w]hat will I tell my students? ... It will be my painful duty to say, 'Put not 
your trust in Judges."' Joan Biskupic, Election Still Splits Court, USA Today 1A (Jan. 22, 
2001). See also Andrew Greeley, Supreme Coun Ditches Judicial Restraint, Chicago Sun-
Times 47 (Dec. 17, 2000) ("[J]udicial restraint goes out the window when the issue is 
awarding, by one vote, the presidency to the Bush dynasty .... The Supreme Court has 
decided George W. Bush is the president, and that's because the Supreme Court can say 
and do whatever it wants .... It was stolen from [Gore] ... by one vote on the Supreme 
Court"). For a further collection of similarly sharp criticisms, see Posner, Breaking the 
Deadlock at 200-01 n.70 (cited in note 21). 
For subsequent extremely hostile commentary from both the academy and the bar, 
see Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election 2000 
at 174 (Oxford U. Press, 2001) (asserting that the decision "may be ranked as the single 
most corrupt decision in Supreme Court history"); Vincent Bugliosi, The Betrayal of 
America: How the Supreme Coun Undermined the Constitution and Chose Our President 
(Thunder's Mountain Press/Nation Books, 2001) (calling the majority Justices "criminals 
in the very truest sense of the word"). 
45. See Charles Lane, Is White House a Pany to Retirement Plans?, Wash. Post A17 
(May 7, 2001) ("O'Connor, 71, and Rehnquist, 76, are the two Justices on whom most of 
today's retirement speculation centers."); Jess Bravin, Richard B. Schmitt, and Robert S. 
Greenberger, Supreme Interests: For Some Justices, the Bush-Gore Case Has a Personal 
Angle, Wall St. J. A1 (Dec. 12, 2000) ("Chief Justice William Rehnquist ... and Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor ... have at times privately talked about retiring and would prefer 
that a Republican appoint their successors."); David Jackson, A New Order in The 
Court? Next president may have to replace several justices - and alter its makeup, Seattle 
Times A3 (June 20, 2000) (speculating on the retirement of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices O'Connor and Stevens based on age and health factors). 
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mental in selecting their own successors may have been felt to be 
particularly threatening to the defense of the awesome authority 
of judicial review that sees the appointment of members of the 
Court as probably the primary, and certainly the most honored, 
exercise of democratic control over a powerful unelected judici-
ary. 
Seemingly, the Court itself recognized the potentially dan-
gerous appearance of partisanship from its participation in the 
election controversy, as evidenced by its production of a terse, 
opaque, and manifestly brokered per curiam opinion in Bush v. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,46 the precursor to Bush 
v. Gore. Thus, on the day the final decision was rendered, 
Robert J. Samuelson commented in the Washington Post that 
the "narrowness of the decisions by the ... U.S. Supreme 
Court[] leave[s] the impression that, despite the high-minded le-
gal justifications, the rulings simply veil individual or party 
choice."47 
In the context of this controversy, it is critical to distinguish 
between judicial (or jurisprudential) ideology and political ide-
ology (or crude partisanship). In view of the Justices' different 
backgrounds and fundamental values, the Supreme Court has 
nearly always been divided by ideological preference and phi-
losophical approach. (And for the last three decades, the split 
has often ended up with five "conservatives" and four "liber-
als.") This is neither unseemly nor improper.48 Genuine, intel-
lectually defensible differences exist regarding the role of the 
Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation. For example, 
the debate on the appropriate balance between states' rights and 
federal power, at the forefront of the Rehnquist Court, has its 
origins with the Framers of the Constitution, signally illustrated 
by the split between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton 
on the issue of whether Congress had power to charter a na-
tional bank. The tension between individual rights versus gov-
ernment power, and between the strict separation of congres-
sional and presidential powers versus functional solutions to the 
46. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
47. Robert J. Samuelson, Self-Inflicted Wound, Wash. Post A47 (Dec. 12, 2000). 
48. See Greenhouse, N.Y. Times at § 4 (cited in note 42) ("That justices embrace 
particular ideologies is neither surprising nor in any way illegitimate; it is part of how 
they came to be selected. In a culture where political differences are so often packaged 
as lawsuits, political sophistication is an asset to any judge."); Ronald Dworkin, A Badly 
Flawed Election, N.Y. Review 53 (Jan. 11, 2001) ("The 5-4 decision would hardly have 
been surprising, or even disturbing, if the constitutional issues were ones about which 
conservatives and liberals disagree as a matter of constitutional principle."). 
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workings of our national government, are additional longstand-
ing jurisprudential differences within the Court (and the nation). 
To make the "ideology vs. partisanship" inquiry, one 
must-regardless of one's view of their merits-examine the in-
dividual Justices' proffered positions for consistency with their 
respective judicial philosophies as reflected in their prior juris-
prudence. Unfortunately, doing so for all nine members of the 
Court does not make it easy to dispel the appearance of parti-
sanship in the Bush v. Gore decision. 
First, the Article II argument, supported by the concurrence 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas-that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state 
election law was so unreasonable as to conflict with Article II's 
command that state legislatures direct the appointment of elec-
tors49-may be sought to be explained on a nonpartisan basis: 
Rather than constituting an act of politically biased activism, it 
was a cure for such unprincipled, partisan (pro-Gore) activism 
(usurpation of the state legislature's will) by the Florida Su-
preme Court.50 Still, the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas ruling ap-
pears to be strikingly at odds with their broader views on feder-
alism. Such oversight of a state court's interpretation of state 
statutes does not correspond to their usual strong respect for 
state autonomy.51 Moreover, the situation was not one where 
the Florida court's alleged impropriety would stand had the Su-
preme Court declined to intervene. Rather, as described above, 
if the Court had stayed out, the matter would have been resolved 
by Congress. In addition, none of the four liberals, ordinarily 
much more sympathetic to exertions of national power that im-
pinge on state sovereignty, joined the position of the Rehnquist 
concurrence. 
49. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112-22. 
50. Another nonpartisan ground for the Court's ruling-that it spared the nation 
from experiencing a "constitutional crisis"- is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 
69-80. 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); City of Boerne v. Rores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); College Sav-
ings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Fund, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Rorida Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trustees of U. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Fur-
thermore, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995), specifically in 
the federal election context, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice O'Connor, dissented to argue that the Court should not interfere with 
a state's eligibility requirements for congressional elections. These justices declined such 
passivity here. 
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Second, as noted above, seven Justices found an equal pro-
tection violation based on the manner of the recount. 52 This ma-
jority included all of the Court's five usual conservatives, an 
unlikely group to broaden the reach of equal protection doc-
trine.53 As Linda Greenhouse observed in the New York Times, 
"the majority's ideology, which includes deference to the states 
and a high threshold for getting into federal court with untested 
52. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110-11. 
53. Because of his length of service on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist's reluc-
tance is most clear. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (Rehnquist, 
J.) (holding that disenfranchisement of convicted felons did not deny equal protection); 
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.) (upholding state legislative 
reapportionment over dilution challenge brought under the Equal Protection Oause); 
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 734-35 (1973) 
(Rehnquist, J.) (upholding law permitting only landowners to vote in "water storage dis-
tricts" elections and apportioning votes according to the assessed valuation of the land 
within the districts); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371-72 (1981) (upholding limitation of 
voting in water district to landowners on a "one acre, one vote" basis); Holt Civic Club v. 
Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60,74-75 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.) (upholding extension of city's police 
and sanitary regulations and its business-lieensing powers to residents of adjacent unin-
corporated communities, but not permitting them to vote in city elections); Rosario v. 
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760-62 (1973) (upholding requirement that voters enroll in the 
party of their choice at least 30 days before the November general election in order to 
vote in the next party primary); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,65 (1973) (invalidating a 
law prohibiting a person "from voting in the primary election of one political party if he 
has voted in the primary of another political party during the preceding 23 months") 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974) (invalidating de-
nial of absentee ballots to persons being held for trial and to convicted misdemeanants) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), holding a political gerrymandering claim 
to be justiciable under equal protection doctrine, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, separately concurred to caution that the issue presented "a political ques-
tion in the truest sense of the tenn," and to warn of the unacceptable risks that "judicial 
intervention on behalf of mainstream political parties ... poses to our political institu-
tions." ld. at 145, 161. While there have been very few cases in the last twenty years rais-
ing constitutional claims of abridgement of voting rights (in a nonracial context), there is 
no reason to believe that the views of Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas would differ 
markedly from those of their more senior conservative colleagues. 
As an indication of the seven-Justice majority's tentativeness to adopt equal protec-
tion reasoning-a readily understandable hesitation in light of its potential application to 
widespread differences throughout the country in voting systems (such as voting ma-
chines-either with levers or touch screens-versus paper ballots versus punch cards) 
and procedures for counting and recounting-the majority qualifies its holding: "Our 
consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection 
in election processes generally presents many complexities." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 
109. "If variances among counties in a state in holding an election and counting ballots 
denies equal protection, then the entire election in Florida was unconstitutional and 
likely the elections in every state." Chemerinsky, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1107 (cited 
in note 10). "[T]he puzzle that the Supreme Court's decision creates is why the Equal 
Protection Clause does not require that states create uniform technologies for counting 
votes rather than just uniform standards for manual recounts." Balkin, 110 Yale L.J. at 
1428 (cited in note 35). For a defense of the equal protection ruling and the argument 
that its scope is properly limited to recounts, see Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness 
of Bush v. Gore, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2002). 
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constitutional theories, would have predicted an opposite re-
sult."54 While the adoption of the equal protection argument by 
Justice Breyer and Justice Souter is less striking, the hypothesis 
that they joined the majority only out of hopes for a compromise 
to save the recount55 obviously does not help rebut characteriza-
tion of the Bush v. Gore decision as a partisan ruling. 
Finally, as also mentioned above, the basic 5-4 conservative-
liberal split decided the issue of remedy-or lack thereof-to 
halt the recount, which effectively ended the election.56 Some-
what analogous to the Article II issue,57 the remedy inquiry re-
quired parsing the intent of the Florida legislature: whether it 
meant to take advantage of the federal statute's safe-harbor 
deadline58 even though this "meant that thousands of contested 
machine-rejected ballots-many clearly indicating voter intent-
would remain uninspected by human eyes. "59 One might expect 
the pro-states' rights Justices to defer to the Florida Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Florida legislature's intentions, and 
remand the case accordingly. However, in just one paragraph of 
its per curiam opinion, the five conservative Justices concluded 
that the Florida legislature wished to exercise the safe harbor60 
and, thus, the Court halted any recounts.61 In sum, whether just 
54. Greenhouse, N.Y. Times at§ 4 (cited in note 42). 
55. See Linda Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: A Special Report - Election Case a Test 
and Trauma for Justices, N.Y. Times Al (Feb. 20, 2001) (describing Justices Breyer and 
Souter as using the equal protection ground to try to forge a compromise that would 
have allowed the count to resume). 
56. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110-11. 
57. See supra text accompanying note 49·50. 
58. 3 U.S.C. § 5, established by Congress in 1887, provides that a state's determina-
tion of its electors, made pursuant to its election laws "at least six days prior to said time 
of meeting of the electors ... shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of elec-
toral votes." Section 5 "represented an effort by Congress to wash its hands of these 
[counting] matters after the disputed Hayes-Tilden election in 1876." Gary C. Leedes, 
The Presidential Election Case: Remembering Safe Harbor Day, 35 U. Richmond L. Rev. 
237, 261 (2001) (quoting Michael J. Glennon, When No Majority Rules 31 (Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1992)). Therefore, if met, the safe-harbor's irrebuttable presumption 
precludes any role for Congress in resolving electoral disputes, rendering moot the hypo-
thetical scenarios set in motion by 3 U.S.C. § 15. See supra text accompanying notes 35-
38. 
59. Frank I. Goodman, Preface to The Supreme Court's Federalism: Real or /mag· 
ined? 574 The Annals 9, 15 (March 2001). 
60. For the view that "here the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to be second-
guessing the Florida court on a question of state law, a federal intrusion upon state 
autonomy more drastic than any of the congressional intrusions nullified by the Court in 
the decisions discussed [in note 51 supra]," see Goodman, Preface to The Supreme 
Court's Federalism at 14·15 (cited in note 59). 
61. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110-11. The majority's reliance on the lack of time for 
a recount remedy has struck some commentators as particularly perverse because the 
Court itself stayed the recount pending its decision. But it must be noted that Bush v. 
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based on the 5-4 vote to stop the recount or a closer look at the 
ideological consistency of the underlying rationales, it is not easy 
to fault the conclusion that the decision "appear[ s] driven not by 
the high politics of judicial philosophy but by naked partisan-
ship."62 
It has been urged that the action of the Rehnquist Court's 
conservative majority in Bush v. Gore is not so surprising when 
viewed in the context of the Supreme Court's overall recent per-
formance.63 Professor John Yoo submits that the Rehnquist 
Court specifically has not at all shied away from actively exercis-
ing its power of judicial review, including significant interven-
tions in the area of voting rights and state election procedures.64 
Through these efforts, Professor Y oo concludes, the Court has 
enlarged earlier forms of judicial review to one of judicial su-
premacy-not acting as an interpreter "but the interpreter of the 
Gore ruled that the recount that had been going on violated equal protection. 
62. Greenhouse, N.Y. Times at § 4 (cited in note 42). See also Law Professors for 
the Rule of Law, 554 Law Professors Say ... (advertisement), N.Y. Times A7 (Jan. 13, 
2001) ("By stopping the vote count in Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court used its power to 
act as political partisans, not judges of a court of law."). The number of subscribers even-
tually reached 673, from 137 law schools. 
63. See Greenhouse, N.Y. Times at§ 4 (cited in note 42); see also Larry D. Kramer, 
No Surprise. It's an Activist Court, N.Y. Times A33 (Dec. 12, 2000) (commenting that 
since the Rehnquist Court is best characterized by judicial supremacy and the extension 
of the doctrine of judicial review, their decision to intervene in the election is not surpris-
ing). 
64. John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, in Sunstein and Epstein, eds, 
The Vote: Bush, Gore and the Supreme Court at 234-35 (cited in note 19) (citing Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)). Professor 
Yoo accurately adds that the Rehnquist Court 
has reaffirmed the right to abortion and has placed limits on religion in the pub-
lic sphere. In the federalism area, it has invalidated a series of federal laws in 
order both to protect state sovereignty and to limit the powers of the national 
government. One of the laws, the Violence Against Women Act, passed Con-
gress by large majorities in both houses of Congress. In the race area, the Court 
has invalidated affirmative action in federal contracting and struck down redis-
tricting that sought to maximize minority representation. On the First Amend-
ment, the Court has invalidated federal laws so as to expand commercial speech 
and to protect indecent or pornographic material. It also has risked confronta-
tion with the political branches by striking down federal laws solely on the 
ground that they violate the separation of powers. Hence, the Court has invali-
dated the Line Item Veto Act and reversed an effort to expand religious free-
doms that the Court had cut back. (Indeed, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1995 unanimously passed the House of Representatives and drew only 
three negative votes in the Senate.] This Court has been anything but shy in 
flexing its powers of judicial review to intervene in some of the most conten-
tious issues of the day. 
Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, in Sunstein and Epstein, eds, The Vote: Bush, 
Gore and the Supreme Court at 236-37 (cited in note 19). 
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Constitution,"65 thus placing Bush v. Gore in the mainstream of 
the Rehnquist Court's flow. 
Still, accepting this activist description of the Rehnquist 
Court does not significantly mitigate the widespread perceptions 
of partisanship generated by Bush v. Gore. Although the deci-
sion to review the case may have been consistent with the 
Court's arrogation of authority, the Justices' respective positions 
in the decision, as discussed above,66 still appear to be difficult to 
reconcile with their normal approaches. Moreover, the distinc-
tion between the Court reviewing the rules and procedures un-
der which elections are held and the Justices determining which 
of the two major party candidates shall be President of the 
United States may fairly be perceived as illustrating a difference 
between articulating principles of judicial philosophy and engag-
ing in partisan politics. As Robert J. Samuelson commented, the 
decision has fostered the "belief that no one in a position of 
power (including a judge or Supreme Court Justice) can rise 
above partisan and personal preferences to defend some larger 
concept of national interest. "6 
IV 
Although debate over faithfulness of the Bush v. Gore deci-
sion to judicial ideals will resonate within legal academia for 
many years to come, there is reason to believe that the Court's 
credibility and the public's respect for it may not suffer more 
than temporarily.68 Two factors may distinguish Bush v. Gore 
65. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, in Sunstein and Epstein, eds, The 
Vote: Bush, Gore and the Supreme Court at 237 (cited in note 19). But see Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (dismissing claim involving the Senate's impeach-
ment process as a political question). 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 42-61. 
67. Samuelson, Self-Inflicted Wound at A47 (cited in note 47). 
68. See generally Michael Klarman, Bush v. Gore: Through the Lens of Constitu-
tional History, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1721 (2001) (theorizing that Court's legitimacy largely 
rests on public opinion rather than the legal reasoning of its opinions and applying multi-
factor analysis-such as quantity, intensity, source, and duration of public disapproval-
to predict that Bush v. Gore will likely not levy long-standing harm to the Court's stand-
ing). 
That public opinion polls have shown no significant reduction in the Court's ap-
proval rating should not, however, be taken as demonstrating that the Court has lost no 
ground. Although in mid-January of this year, 59 percent of Americans approved of how 
the Court was doing its job, down only three points from August 2000, the political com-
position of the results changed dramatically. In August, 60 percent of Republicans and 
70 percent of Democrats were supportive; in January, the figures were 80 percent of Re-
publicans and only 42 percent of Democrats. Wendy W. Simmons, Election Con_troversy 
Apparently Drove Partisan Wedge into Attitudes Towards Supreme Court, available at 
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from other rulings that have wounded the Court's prestige and 
drained its institutional capital. 
First, a substantial number of people believed that the na-
tion was headed toward some form of "constitutional crisis" that 
the Supreme Court's intervention was necessary to avoid.69 Al-
though I have argued above that the dispute resolution process 
was working as expected, and that the political branches should 
have been able to adequately handle the various scenarios,70 
many opinion leaders did not share this view .71 The media, 
whose interests are often served by hyperbole, joined in propa-
gating this perception. For example, the cover of Newsweek pic-
tured the Constitution with the word "CHAOS" emblazoned 
across it,72 and U.S. News titled its feature election story "Confu-
sion Reigns. "73 
Following the Supreme Court's decision, various commen-
tators characterized the Justices as rescuing the nation from a 
dangerous impasse to be created by protracted and chaotic con-
gressional bickering that might threaten the country's political 
stability.74 Not surprisingly, conservatives embraced this view. 
<http://www.gallup.com./poll/releases/pr010116.asp> (last visited Jan. 16 2001). More-
over, when asked whether Bush v. Gore "was based more on partisan politics, or more on 
an objective interpretation of the law," 65 percent of Gore voters but only 10 percent of 
Bush voters chose the former explanation. CBS News Poll, Dec. 14-16, 2000. Similarly, 
only 17 percent of Gore supporters thought the decision was "fair," as compared to 94 
percent of Bush enthusiasts, CNNIUSAToday!GallupPoll, Dec. 13, 2000, while the ruling 
caused 54 percent of Gore backers, as opposed to only 5 percent of those for Bush, to 
"lose confidence" in the Court. Id. Moreover, another post-discussion poll found that 
although "most Americans support the actions of the Supreme Court in the presidential 
dispute [and] believe the decision was fairly made," there were dramatic differences be-
tween black and white Americans and between white Republicans and white Democrats. 
James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester K. Spence, The Supreme Court and 
the 2000 Presidential Election, unpublished manuscript, available at <http://www.artsci. 
wustl.edu/-legit/research.html> (last visited Sept. 7, 2001). Finally, this same survey 
showed that while only 29 percent of respondents thought that the justices based their 
votes in Bush v. Gore on their own preferences for president rather than the "legal merits 
of the case," nearly half of the Democrats felt otherwise. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Robert Novak, From Legacy to Footnote, Chicago-Sun Times 43 (Dec. 
14, 2000) ("[T]he bare majority of the high court saved the country from this potential 
constitutional crisis resulting from Gore's doggedness"). 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41. 
71. See Linda Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: A Special Report A1 (Feb. 19, 2001) (de-
scribing the "belief among respected opinion leaders that a national crisis required the 
court's intervention"). 
72. Newsweek (cover) (Dec. 18, 2000). 
73. U.S. News & World Report X (Dec. 18, 2000). 
74. See, e.g., Robert Justin Lipkin, A Derelict on the Waters of the Law?, Congress 
Monthly 3 (Jan./Feb. 2001) ("(T]he election 2000 controversy was stealing valuable time 
from the next administration and dangerously dividing the nation; the crisis needed reso-
lution."); Leedes, 35 U. Richmond L. Rev. at 247 (cited in note 58) (praising the finality 
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For example, Judge Richard Posner questioned, "What exactly is 
the Supreme Court good for if it refuses to examine a likely con-
stitutional error that if uncorrected will engender a national cri-
sis?"75 Walter Berns likewise credited the Court with "sav[in~J 
us from a devastating political outcome ... an absolute mess." 
More significantly for our purposes, some who supported Vice 
President Gore, or who otherwise strongly disagreed with the 
Court's outcome, nonetheless acknowledged this salutary effect 
of the decision. Thus, Professor Cass Sunstein, a moderate lib-
eral, reflected that the Court "might actually have done some-
thing that is to the nation's benefit. From the point of view of 
statesmanship, the Court may end up looking well. "77 In fact, in 
his concession speech, Vice President Gore himself led the call 
to accept the finality and legitimacy of the Court's decision, reas-
suring the nation that no constitutional controversy remained 
now that the Court had spoken.78 
Similarly, much of the American public, regardless of its 
politics, may have shared a collective sigh of relief that the elec-
tion was finally over. The Chicago Tribune reported that "land-
slide majorities of Americans had told pollsters they wanted the 
justices to resolve the Florida case,"79 presumably with the atti-
tude that better that it be done, than that it be done right. A 
Wall Street Journal editorial captures this sentiment: "We expect 
attained by the Court's decision given the approaching brink of a crisis that may have 
otherwise occurred with conflicting sets of electors). 
75. Benjamin Wittes, Maybe the Court Got It Right: A Judge's Defense of the Flor-
ida Election Decision, Wash. Post (Feb. 21, 2001), available at <http://washingtonpost. 
cornfwp-dyn/articles/A32533-2001Feb20.htrnl)> (quoting Posner). See also Richard Pos-
ner, The Triumph of Experience, Harper's 32 (May 2001). For fuller development of 
Judge Posner's view that Congress would not have behaved in a statesmanlike fashion, 
but rather would produce a scene of partisanship run amok, see Posner, Breaking the 
Deadlock at 162-63 (cited in note 21). 
76. Jonathan Groner, Will Election Case Do Damage to the Judiciary?, Legal Times 
15 (Dec. 18, 2000). The argument is further developed in Balkin, 110 Yale L.J. at 1436-37 
(cited in note 35): "Republicans hungered to regain control of the presidency after eight 
years .... [In Congress], they may well have overreacted and behaved very badly indeed. 
It was possible that whatever the Congress did would be seen widely as the rawest form 
of politics, with no concern for fairness or justice. This would have delegitirnated the 
new president and prevented him from governing effectively." 
77. Groner, Will Election Case Do Damage to the Judiciary? at 15 (cited in note 76). 
78. AI Gore, Transcript of Concession Speech. And the public appears to have 
heeded Gore's call. Even though only a bare majority of Americans initially agreed with 
the Court's ruling, 80% of respondents to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted on 
December 13, 2000 recognized Bush as the legitimate winner of the 2000 presidential 
election. David W. Moore, Eight in Ten Americans to Accept Bush as "Legitimate," 
Gallup News Service (Dec. 14, 2000), available at <http://www.gallup.cornfpo!Vreleasesl 
pr001214.asp> (visited April 7, 2001). 
79. Don't Blame the Supreme Court, Chicago Trib. 28 (Dec. 15, 2000). 
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most Americans will get over this election pretty quickly. They 
realize the machinery hit an alligator in the road and the U.S. 
Supreme Court had no choice but to tow us home."80 As a con-
sequence, the Court's vulnerability to invective and other forms 
of attack in such highly disputed matters as segregation, school 
prayer, and abortion, where all those on the "losing" side deeply 
resented the Justices' "wrong" decision, is greatly mitigated 
when the "losers" see some virtue in the Court's action. 
Second, unlike prior controversial cases that have had a pro-
found impact on the Court's standing, the matter of Bush v. 
Gore is over and will not reopen in the Judicial Branch.81 This 
final quality of the decision may be contrasted with the ongoing 
nature of the Court's role in other areas where the Justices have 
faced widespread criticism and suffered various wounds. During 
the New Deal era, the Court confronted severe public hostility 
for its repeated invalidation of national economic recovery legis-
lation aimed at ending the Great Depression.82 The racial segre-
gation cases caused intense controversy over a much lon~er pe-
riod, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 3 and 
continuing regularly for at least two decades.84 The clash over 
school prayer, starting in the early 1960s,85 has yet to fully 
abate.86 Finally, with abortion, the Court absorbed negative re-
action in case after case following Roe v. Wade from those gov-
ernment officials and members of the public who disagreed with 
80. The Agenda, Wall St. 1. A16 (Dec. 15, 2000). 
81. It remains to be seen whether Democrats in the Senate will invoke the ruling in 
Bush v. Gore in responding to President Bush's judicial nominations, especially to the 
Supreme Court. "They can repeatedly remind people that the Court decided the election 
and play up the Court's conflict of interest in choosing the president who would choose 
the Justices' colleagues and successors .... They can also emphasize the injustice of Jet-
ting the Court appoint the person who will nominate their colleagues and successors and 
send the Court careening even more strongly to the right." Balkin, 110 Yale L.J. at 1456, 
1458 (cited in note 35). Still, such use of the decision appears quite different, in terms of 
public antipathy toward the Court, than a subsequent judicial ruling that directly pro-
duces more of the same kind of perceived injurious results as did the earlier judgment. 
82. During a two year period, the Court struck down six major New Deal statutes. 
83. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
84. After Brown, cases involving the enforcement of school desegregation flooded 
the lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court was forced to render numerous critical 
decisions. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. 1 (1958); Griffin v. Prince Edward County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Green v. 
New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 
(1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
85. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963). 
86. See Santa Fe lnd. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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either its premises or result or both.87 In addition, all four areas 
just discussed produced numerous lower court cases, each pro-
viding renewed opportunity for public dissatisfaction with the 
Court and calls for political reprisals. 
In contrast, Bush v. Gore is important, not because it re-
solved a substantive question involving Florida's selection of 
presidential electors, or generated some enduring doctrine or 
principle likely to spark an ongoing democratic debate. Rather, 
the case was momentous because it resulted in the election of 
President George W. Bush, a matter virtually impossible ever to 
arise again. The equal protection principle on which the Court 
based its decision will surely be invoked in the future by losing 
candidates of every kind. But, for a variety of reasons-
especially the fact that it calls into question issues that pervade 
election systems throughout the countryBB-it is highly doubtful 
that the Supreme Court will rely on it again for a finding of un-
constitutionality.89 Furthermore, unlike law professors, political 
figures, and a few similarly minded persons, most Americans 
have a short memory for such events. Regardless of party, most 
of the country, following the urging of Vice President Gore, have 
accepted the fact that George W. Bush will occupy the White 
House until at least 2004.90 Stimulated by the fast-shifting nature 
of media coverage, the public's political attention quickly turned 
to other aspects of the Bush Administration and its activities. 
New scandals and crises rapidly stole the headlines, and, within 
days, even comedians abandoned election jokes in favor of the 
new president's timely gaffes. Without the recurrent irritant 
posed by ongoing litigation involving sensitive issues such as 
economic welfare, race, prayer, and abortion, there is a real 
chance that Bush v. Gore will not fall into the category of "self 
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
88. See B.J. Palermo, Rights Groups Latch Onto Bush v. Gore, Nat!. L.J. A1 (May 
21, 2001) (reporting "lawsuits across the country" using rationale to challenge use of 
punch-card voting machines). 
89. In fact, the Court went out of its way to limit the underlying equal protection 
rationale to the unique context of the case, seeking to avoid federal judicial supervision 
of all elections contests, by the unambiguous edict that "[o]ur consideration is limited to 
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes gen-
erally presents many complexities." See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. Even if the equal 
protection rationale is utilized in future voting rights cases, it will almost surely never 
arise again to decide a presidential election. 
90. One public opinion poll, taken shortly after the election, found that 85 percent 
of respondents perceived the Bush Presidency as legitimate. Gibson, Caldeira and 
Spence, The Supreme Court and the 2000 Presidential Election (cited in note 68). 
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inflicted wounds"91 that were fully realized, best characterized by 
Dred Scott. Only time will tell.92 
91. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Foundations, 
Methods and Achievements 50 (Columbia U. Press, 1928). 
92. Poll responses early in 2001 did "not seem consistent with the view that the 
Court inflicted a serious wound on itself' because of Bush v. Gore. See James L. Gibson, 
Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester K. Spence, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
unpublished manuscript, available at <http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/-legitlresearch.html> 
(visited Sept. 7, 2001). 
